Duquesne Law Review
Volume 39
Number 3 The Pennsylvania Issue

Article 4

2001

Romeo Revisited: Limiting the Statute of Limitations That Applies
to Claims for Breach of a Construction Contract
Kristie M. Kachuriak

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kristie M. Kachuriak, Romeo Revisited: Limiting the Statute of Limitations That Applies to Claims for
Breach of a Construction Contract, 39 Duq. L. Rev. 551 (2001).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol39/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Romeo Revisited:
Limiting the Statute of Limitations That Applies to
Claims for Breach of a Construction Contract
Kristie M. Kachuriak*
INTRODUCTION

The Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Romeo & Sons,
Inc. v. PC. Yezbak & Son, Inc. ("Romeo I")' and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision on appeal in Romeo & Sons, Inc. v. PC.
Yezbak & Son, Inc. ("Romeo IF')2 have created undue confusion as
to whether a four-year or a six-year statute of limitations applies to
claims for breach of a written construction contract in
Pennsylvania. In Romeo I, the superior court applied the incorrect
statutory scheme governing limitations of actions to the breach of
contract claim at issue in that case and mistakenly held that a
six-year statute of limitations applies to claims for breach of a
written construction contract.3 Although the supreme court in
Romeo II attempted to clarify the superior court's decision, the
Romeo I decision opened the door for an argument that a six-year
statute of limitations applies to claims for breach of a written
construction contract in all cases.
The superior court soon will have an opportunity to firmly close
the door on any such argument that may be contrived from its
Romeo I decision. The case of Gustine Uniontown Associates, Ltd.
v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc. (the "Gustine case"), which is
presently on appeal to the superior court, will force the court to
revisit the issue of whether a four-year or a six-year statute of
limitations applies to claims for breach of a written construction
* J.D. 1996, The Dickinson School of Law, B.A. magna cum laude, phi beta kappa, 1993,
Allegheny College. The author, a former law clerk to the Honorable Gary L Lancaster,
U.S.D.J., W.D.Pa_, is an attorney practicing in the legal department of United States Filter
Corporation in Warrendale, Pennsylvania.
1. 617 A.2d 1320 (Pa. Super. 1992) ("Romeo 1).
2. 652 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1995) ("Romeo II-).
3. See Romeo I, 617 A.2d at 1323. A complete analysis of the superior court's decision
in Romeo I and the supreme court's decision on appeal in Romeo II is set forth in Part I.B.,

irfra.
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contract.4
The Gustine case involves claims by Gustine for breach of
contract, breach of implied warranty, professional negligence, and
other contract-based and tort-based claims against a number of
defendants who were engaged by Gustine as architects, engineers,
consultants and contractors to design and construct a shopping
mall. Gustine argued to the Allegheny County Court of Common
Pleas that all of its claims were governed by a six-year statute of
limitations. 5 At the preliminary objection stage in the court of
common pleas, 6 Judge R. Stanton Wettick considered whether the
December 20, 1982 amendments to the statute of limitations
provisions of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code7 reduced the
limitations period for claims for breach of a written construction
contract from six years to four years. Judge Wettick properly
determined that Gustine's contract-based claims were subject to a
four-year statute of limitations8 and that Gustine's tort-based claims
4. The appeal in the Gustine case that is pending before the Pennsylvania Superior
Court is docketed at 1611 WDA 2000. By way of background, Gustine initiated the case by
filing a praecipe for writ of summons in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania in July 1999. Subsequently, in or about January 2000, Gustine filed its
complaint against defendants Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., Anthony Crane Rental, LP.,
Architectural
Services Group, Inc., Construction Engineering
Consultants, Inc.,
Geomechanics, Inc., Jabille Development Corp., Mascaro Incorporated, McMillen Engineering,
Inc., P.C. Yezbak & Son, Inc., Penn Transportation Services, Inc., Ruprecht, Schroeder &
Hoffman, Architects, S&R Restaurants, Inc., and Wendy's of Greater Pittsburgh, Inc.
Defendant Mascaro Incorporated joined certain additional defendants in the case, including
Gustine Uniontown, Inc., The Gustine Company, Inc., BSW Architects, and Thor Concrete
Construction, Inc. The case was designated as a complex case in the common pleas court
and assigned to the Honorable R. Stanton Wettick, Jr.
5. See Gustine's Position Statement in Support of Application of Six-Year Statute of
Limitation to All Claims Raised in Plaintiffs Complaint, which is a part of the docket at GD
No. 99-12166 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
6. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030(a) provides that the statute of limitations
defense is to be "pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading 'New Matter.' " In the
Gustine case, the parties agreed to brief and argue the statute of limitations issue at the
preliminary objection stage of the proceedings because, as stated by Judge Wettick in his
July 18, 2000 opinion on the statute of limitations issue, "the discovery rule will be a
significant factual issue in this litigation if I do not accept [Gustine's] position that its claims
are governed by a six-year limitation period." Gustine Uniontown Assocs., Ltd. v. Anthony
Crane Rental, Inc., 148 PL.J. 233 (September 22, 2000) (Pittsburgh Legal Journal). Thus, as a
result of discovery nile concerns, it was important for the court to determine as early as
possible in the case which statute of limitations applied to Gustine's claims.
7. The December 20, 1982 amendments to the four-year and six-year statute of
limitations provisions of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code are discussed in Part I, infra.
8. Judge Wettick concluded that Gustine's contract-based claims were governed by the
four-year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(8) under the 1982 statutory
scheme. As discussed in detail in Part I, infra, section 5525(8) requires that an action upon a
written contract be commenced within four years. Judge Wettick specifically stated, "[flor
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were subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 9 Not satisfied with
this decision, Gustine requested that Judge Wettick certify the
statute of limitations issue for immediate appellate review by the
superior court. 10
The Gustine case provides the superior court the opportunity to
clarify and correct its Romeo I decision by unequivocally holding
that the four-year statute of limitations period set forth in title 42,
section 5525, subsection 8 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes Annotated ("section 5525(8)") means what it says - that
all breach of contract claims arising from written contracts,
including construction contracts, are subject to a four-year statute
of limitations. The purpose of this Article is to present a
comprehensive argument in support of such a holding by the
superior court when it decides the Gustine case. Accordingly, Part I
of this Article provides an overview of the 1980 and the 1982
statutory schemes relative to the four-year and the six-year statutes
of limitation and, in so doing, analyzes the impact of the 1982
amendment to the statute of limitations provisions that apply to
breach of contract claims. Part II presents the argument that claims
for breach of a construction contract are governed by the four-year
statute of limitations set forth in section 5525(8). This Part
identifies three reasons why such a conclusion is justified and
examines each of those reasons in turn. The Article concludes that
the four-year statute of limitations of section 5525(8)
unquestionably applies to all claims for breach of a written
contract, including claims for breach of a written contract that
the reasons that I have discussed, the language of § 5525(8) clearly reaches written contracts
for the construction of real estate." Gustine, 148 P.J. at 234. The "reasons" cited by Judge
Wettick are best summarized in this excerpt from his opinion:
The language of § 5525(8) could not be clearer a single limitation period of four years
governs actions upon any written contracts unless there is another limitation period
specified in the subchapter. Furthermore, construction contracts involving real estate
are not esoteric transactions that the Legislature might have overlooked.
Consequently, since no other subsection refers to written contracts for the
construction of real estate, the Legislature intended for these contracts to be governed
by the four-year limitation period of § 5525.
Id.
9. Judge Wettick held that Gustine's tort claims were governed by the two-year statute
at 234. The court's decision
of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. Gustine, 148 PJ.
regarding Gustine's tort claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
10. The issues to be raised by Gustine on appeal to the Superior Court include, inter
a/ia, whether Judge Wettick erred in holding that Gustine's contract-based claims are
governed by a four-year statute of limitations instead of a six-year statute of limitations and
whether Judge Wettick erred in determining that Gustine's tort-based claims are governed by
a two-year statute of limitations instead of a six-year statute of limitations.
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relates to construction.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE

1980

AND

1982

VERSIONS OF THE STATUTES OF

LIMITATIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS

In Pennsylvania, prior to 1982, certain contract-based claims
were subject to a four-year statute of limitations, while other
contract-based claims were subject to a six-year statute of
limitations. Specifically, under the 1980 statutory scheme, a
four-year statute of limitations applied to: (1) contracts for the sale,
construction or furnishing of tangible personal property or fixtures;
(2) contracts for the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial
Code; (3) an express contract not founded upon a written
instrument; and (4) a contract implied in law.' Under the 1980
framework, contract-based claims that were subject to a six-year
statute of limitations included: (1) an action upon a judgment or
decree of any state or federal court; (2) an action upon a contract,
obligation or liability founded upon a bond, note or other written
instrument; and (3) an action upon any official bond. 12 The 1980
statutory framework contained a six-year "catch-all" statute of
limitations that applied to any civil action or proceeding that was
not subject to another specified limitations period. 13
The statutory scheme relative to the four-year and the six-year
statutes of limitations was amended in 1982 (the "1982
Amendment"). The 1982 Amendment to title 42, sections 5525 and
5527 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated ("section
55250" and "section 55270") represented a statutory reorganization
of sorts. Significantly, as a result of the 1982 Amendment, breach of
contract claims that were formerly subject to a six-year statute of
limitations are now included under the four-year limitations period
of section 5525. Hence, since 1982, the four-year statute of
limitations has applied to the same four contract-based claims as
under the 1980 framework, 4 as well as to four additional
contract-based claims: an action upon a judgment or decree of any
state or federal court; an action upon any official bond of a public
official, officer or employee; an action upon a negotiable or
nonnegotiable bond, note or other similar written instrument; and
11. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(1)-(4) (1980).
12. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527(1)-(3) (1980).
13. See.42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527(6) (1980).
14. Compare 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(1)-(4) (1980), with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(1)-(4) (1982)
(subparagraphs (1)-(4) of section 5525 remained the same under the 1980 and the 1982
statutory schemes).
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an action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon a
writing.'5 The 1982 Amendment added these four contract-based
claims to section 5525 as subparagraphs (5)-(8). The substance of
these "new" subparagraphs was formerly contained in section
5527(1)-(3) under the 1980 scheme. 6 As a result of the 1982
Amendment, the only claims that remain subject to section 5527's
six-year "catch-all" statute of limitations are those claims not
governed by any other expressly defined limitations period.' 7
The 1982 Amendment to sections 5525 and 5527 makes clear that
all contract-based claims are subject to a four-year statute of
limitations.' 8 Consistent with the 1982 Amendment, as explained in
detail below, claims premised upon breach of a construction
contract, like all other contract-based claims, are governed by the
unambiguous four-year statute of limitations set forth in section
5525(8).
II.

CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT ARE GOVERNED
BY THE

FOUR-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF SECTION

5525(8)

Pursuant to the 1982 Amendment, a breach of contract claim
based upon a written contract is subject to the four-year statute of
limitations set forth in section 5525(8).' 9 The 1982 version of
section 5525(8) does not single out specific types of written
contracts, nor does it differentiate among written contracts relating
to various subjects. Section 5525(8) applies to all breach of
contract claims "founded upon a writing." Accordingly, the
four-year statute of limitations contained in section 5525(8) of the
1982 statutory scheme applies to claims for breach of a written
construction contract, like all other written contracts. The clear
15. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(5)-(8) (1982) (emphasis added).
16. Compare 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527(1)-(3) (1980), with 42 PaC.S.A. § 5525(5)-(8) (1982)
(the subject matter of section 5525(5) under the 1982 scheme was formerly section 5527(1)
under the 1980 scheme; the substance of the 1982 version of section 5525(6) was formerly
section 5527(3) under the 1980 framework; and sections 5525(7) and (8) under the 1982
statute were formerly part of section 5527(2) under the 1980 statutory framework).
17. Compare 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527(6) (1980), with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527 (1982) (the
language of the six-year "catch-all" statute of limitations set forth in the current version of
section 5527 is identical to the language of its predecessor, section 5527(6) under the 1980
statutory scheme).
18. See Packer Soc'y Hill Travel Agency, Inc. v. Presbyterian Univ. of Pennsylvania Med.
Ctr., 635 A.2d 649, 652 (Pa. Super. 1993) (noting that the legislature adopted 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
5525(8) and 5527 in their present forms in 1982 and holding that the statute of limitations for
alt written contracts is now four years) (emphasis added).
19. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(8) (1982) (stating that an action upon a contract "founded
upon a writing" must be commenced within four years).
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and unambiguous language of section 5525(8), as well as the
opinions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in the Romeo I and Romeo II cases, respectively,
support this conclusion. This conclusion is further strengthened by
the fact that there is no basis to afford construction contracts
treatment distinct from other written contracts. Each of these
factors that support the application of the four-year statute of
limitations set forth in section 5525(8) to construction contracts
will be analyzed in turn below.
A.

The Clear and Unambiguous Language of Section 5525(8)
Dictates That a Four-Year Statute of Limitations Be Applied
to Claims for Breach of a Construction Contract

Pursuant to the 1982 Amendment, section 5525(8) provides that a
four-year limitations period applies to:
[a]n action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded
upon a writing not specified in paragraph (7) [relating to
negotiable or nonnegotiable bonds, notes or other similar
instruments in writing], under seal or otherwise, except an
action subject to another limitation specified in this
subchapter.
On its face, the language of section 5525(8) is clear that a claim for
breach of a written contract must be commenced within four years.
Section 5525(8) does not single out certain claims for breach of a
written contract as subject to the four-year statute while excluding
others. Accordingly, in light of the plain language of section
5525(8), a claim for breach of a written construction contract
entered into after the 1982 Amendment, like all other breach of
contract claims, is subject to the four-year statute of limitations.
If there is any question, however, as to whether the language of
section 5525(8) is clear and unambiguous regarding its applicability
to all written contracts, the well-established principles of statutory
analysis guide the inquiry. "The starting point of statutory analysis
is the language employed by the legislature in the statute itself and
[courts are to] assume[] that the legislative purpose is expressed by
the ordinary meaning of the words used." 0 "When the words of the
statute are unambiguous, the ordinary meaning of those words
20. Superior PreCast, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 71 F Supp. 2d 438, 450 (E.D.
Pa. 1999) (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982)).
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controls and judicial inquiry is complete." 21 Therefore, when the
words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
22
of it is not to be disregarded.
After applying these principles of statutory analysis to section
5525(8) [the post-1982 Amendment limitations period for written
contracts], one must conclude that the language of section 5525(8)
is clear and free of ambiguity.2 3 For this reason, courts are bound
to first consider and apply the plain and unambiguous language of
section 5525(8) before relying upon case law to determine the
appropriate statute of limitations that governs a claim for breach of
a written construction contract.24 As already noted at the outset of
Part II.A., the plain and unambiguous language of section 5525(8)
mandates that courts apply a four-year statute of limitations to all
claims for breach of a written contract, including a written
construction contract.
This result does not change even if a court was to determine that
section 5525(8) is ambiguous and find it necessary to rely upon
case law for guidance. The relevant case law lends further support
to the conclusion that section 5525(8)'s four-year statute of
limitations applies to claims for breach of a construction contract.
Prior to the 1982 Amendment, in the case of Ragnar Benson,
Inc. v. Bethel Mart Associates,25 which involved an alleged breach
of a shopping center construction contract, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that "[tihe statute for contract matters provides
for a six-year limit, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527(2)."26 It is undisputed that
contract claims based upon a writing that accrued prior to the 1982
Amendment were subject to the six-year statute of limitations set
forth in section 5527(2) (1980). In its analysis of that section, it is
noteworthy that the Ragnar court held that "contract matters," in
general, were subject to a six-year statute of limitations at that
21. Superior PreCast, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (citing Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
22. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). Section 1921(b) specifically provides, "[w]hen the words of a
statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under
the pretext of pursuing its spirit."
23. The language of section 5525(8) has been interpreted as being unambiguous. See
Packer,635 A.2d at 651 (construing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(8) and stating that "the words of the
statute are clear and free of ambiguity").
24. See Primiano v. City of Philadelphia, 739 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. Commw. 1999)
(holding that there is no need to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly when the
statute's language clearly manifests what the legislature intended, i.e., when there is no
ambiguity).
25. 454 A.2d 599 (Pa. Super. 1982).
26. Id. at 603.
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time. The Ragnar court did not hold that a six-year limitation
period uniquely applied to construction contracts. Therefore, the
Ragnar court's holding is directly contrary. to an argument that
somehow the "construction project" aspect of a breach of contract
claim acts as a catalyst to convert what would otherwise be a
four-year statute to a six-year statute of limitations.
The Ragnar holding is also contrary to an argument that there is
an established history in Pennsylvania of applying a six-year statute
to construction contract claims, thus creating a "public policy" in
favor of such application. In fact, the cases that may arguably
support a so-called "public policy" are nothing more than breach of
contract cases decided prior to the 1982 Amendment. Similar to
Ragnar, in Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. Campbell, Rea, Hayes &
Large,27 A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Building Corp.,28 DeMatteo v.
White29 and Med-Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth,30 the courts applied a
six-year statute of limitations to breach of contract claims that
related to construction matters. The thrust of those decisions was
simply that they involved breach of contract claims. The fact that
the subject matter of those cases happened to relate to a
construction contract was not germane to the courts' respective
analyses of the statute of limitations issue. Indeed, in each of those
cases, the court did not single out the construction aspect of the
breach of contract claim as distinct from any other breach of
contract claim. Rather, any breach of contract claim would have
been subject to a six-year statute of limitations at the time those
cases were decided (prior to the 1982 Amendment).
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, all breach of contract
claims founded upon a writing must be commenced within four
years pursuant to section 5525(8).31 Section 5525(8), alone, is clear
and unambiguous in its applicability to all breach of contract
claims, including breach of contract claims that relate to
construction matters. A fortiori, resort to case law analysis further
supports the conclusion that construction contracts are governed
by the four-year statute of limitations of section 5525(8).
27. 492 F Supp. 67 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
28. 420 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 1980).
29. 336 A.2d 355 (Pa. Super. 1975).
30. 257 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 1969).
31. See Packer, 635 A.2d at 652 (holding that the four-year statute of limitations of
section 5525(8) applies to claims based upon written contracts arising subsequent to the
1982 Amendment); Unisys Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Vision, Inc., 630 A.2d 55, 58 (Pa. Super. 1993)
(holding that a written agreement is governed by section 5525(8)).
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B. The Romeo I and Romeo II Cases Lend FurtherSupport to the
Conclusion That the Four-Year Statute of Limitations of
Section 5525(8) Applies to Claims for Breach of a
Construction Contract
As stated at the outset of this Article, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's decision in Romeo I and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision on appeal in Romeo II have created undue confusion as to
the statute of limitations that applies to construction contracts.
Close scrutiny of the Romeo I and Romeo II decisions reveals,
however, that the six-year "catch-all" statute of limitations does not
apply to claims for breach of a construction contract; rather, the
four-year statute of limitations contained in section 5525(8) applies
to all breach of contract claims based upon a written contract,
including claims based upon a written construction contract.
The contract at issue in both Romeo I and Romeo II was a
contract for the construction of a warehouse/office building.
Notably, the contract at issue was entered into in 1979 and the
work was completed in 1980, before the 1982 Amendment. 32 The
facts supplied in the Romeo cases reveal that Yezbak, as contractor,
completed the project in July 1980.3 Approximately two months
later, in September 1980, Romeo, who was the owner of the
project, claimed that it noticed structural defects in the building's
floor, ceiling, downspouts, and gutters.3 After Yezbak discontinued
its efforts to remedy the alleged deficiencies in May 1986, Romeo
filed suit for breach of implied warranty of suitability for specific
purpose, breach of express warranty of quality of workmanship,
and breach of contract.m
The trial court concluded that Romeo's claims against Yezbak
were barred by the four-year statute of limitations contained in
section 5525. On appeal, in Romeo I, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court considered this issue under the post-1982 Amendment
statutory scheme, despite the fact that the contract in question was
entered into in 1979 and the breach occurred in 1980, prior to the
1982 Amendment. The Romeo I court explained that it sought to
determine whether the four-year statute of limitations contained in
section 5525(1), relating to contracts for the sale, construction or
furnishing of tangible personal property or fixtures, applied or
32. Romeo I, 617 k2d at 1321.
33. Id.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
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whether the six-year "catch-all" statute of limitations contained in
section 5527 controlled.36 The superior court in Romeo I reversed
the trial court and held that the trial court erred in not applying the
six-year "catch-all" statute of limitations set forth in section 5527
under the 1982 statutory scheme. Accordingly, the superior court
ruled that a six-year limitations period applied to the construction
controversy at issue in Romeo L 3 1 In so ruling, the superior court
relied upon policy-based concerns, which it apparently believed
were unique to construction contracts s
Yezbak appealed the superior court's decision to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The supreme court, in Romeo II, only
affirmed the superior court's result.3 9 The supreme court's Romeo II
decision did not expressly or implicitly affirm the rationale that
supported the superior court's decision in Romeo L To the contrary,
the supreme court declined to comment upon the wisdom of the
superior court's policy-based conclusion. 40 Although the supreme
court ultimately affirmed the application of a six-year statute to
Romeo's claim, it is significant that the supreme court observed
that the superior court had erred in its reliance upon the post-1982
Amendment version of either section 5525 or section 5527.
The supreme court's decision pointed out that the superior court
"proceeded under the erroneous assumption that the current
version of either section 5525 or section 5527, both of which were
amended in 1982, governs this case."41 The supreme court explained
that the 1980 statutory scheme applied because the breach at issue
in Romeo I and Romeo H occurred in 1980.42 In this regard, the
36. Id. at 1322.
37. In Romeo I, the superior court stated, "we find that the statute of limitations
applicable to the construction contract controversy with which we are faced is section 5527,
Six year limitation." Romeo I, 617 A.2d at 1323.
38. In support of its policy-based concerns, the Romeo I court stated, "the purchaser
and his investment must be afforded the six years of protection provided by section 5527
[under the 1982 statutory scheme]." Id. According to the superior court, this result was
justified "[iln the interest of fair play and in light of the expected long-term life span of a
house and/or commercial structure and the builder's attendant ethical and legal
responsibilities to its customer . .. ." Id. In the superior court's view, "[t]o find otherwise
would be grossly unfair to the buyer. . . ." Id.
39. See Romeo II, 652 A.2d at 833. The supreme court stated, "we affirm the Superior
Court's conclusion that Romeo's complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations, but
write to clarify the court's application of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5527 (1982) to the instant facts." Id. at
832.
40. Id. at 832-33.
41. Id. at 832 (emphasis added).
42. Id. In a breach of contract action, the statute of limitations begins to run from the
time of the breach. Aberman, 420 A.2d at 599 (citing In re Dixon's Estate, 233 A.2d 242 (Pa-
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supreme court stated, "[tihe limitations period applicable to causes
of action based on construction contracts accruing in 1980 was
codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5527(2)."4 This statement by the supreme
court indicates that it was the superior court's analysis in Romeo I,
based upon section 5525(1), relating to contracts for the sale,
construction or furnishing of tangible personal property or fixtures,
that was completely inapplicable in that case.
Moreover, it is significant that the supreme court pointed out
that if the superior court in Romeo I had properly relied upon the
1980 statutory scheme, section 5527(2) of the 1980 scheme would
have been the provision that applied to the contract in issue.4 The
1980 version of section 5527(2) related to written contracts. As
discussed in detail in Part I, supra, the content of section 5527(2)
is now contained in section 5525(8) under the 1982 Amendment. All
of this reveals that under the 1980 statutory scheme, pursuant to
which the Romeo I case was decided, all breach of contract claims
based upon a writing, regardless of the subject matter, were
governed by a six-year statute of limitations. After the 1982
Amendment, all breach of contract claims based upon a writing,
regardless of the subject matter, are governed by a four-year
statute of limitations. This change from a six-year statute to a
four-year statute for breach of contract claims based upon a
writing appears to reflect the intent of the Pennsylvania Legislature
in amending the statutory scheme relating to limitations of
45
actions.
1967)). Furthermore, "in the case of a latent defect in construction, the statute of limitations
will not start to run until the injured party becomes aware, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have become aware, of the defect." Id. (citing cases). In the Romeo I case,
Romeo alleged that it first became aware of defects in the warehouse/office building in
September 1980. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the Romeo II court
concluded that Romeo's claim accrued in 1980 and that the statute of limitations set forth in
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527(2) (1980) was applicable to that claim. See infra note 43 and
accompanying text.
43. Romeo II, 652 A.2d at 832.
44. The Romeo II court stated, "[tihe Superior Court, although correctly applying a
six-year limitation period, erroneously concluded that 42 Pa.C.S. § 5527 (1982) controls this
scenario. Rather, 42 PaC.S. § 5527(2)(1980), before its amendment in 1982, governs the
instant claim." Id. at 831 (footnotes omitted).
45. Although there is a dearth of information relative to the legislative history
surrounding the 1982 Amendment, the historical and statutory notes to the year 2000 update
to 42 PaC.S.A. § 5527 (1982) provide insight into the Pennsylvania Legislature's intent in
amending the statutory scheme governing limitations of actions. Those historical and
statutory notes state, "[ffor provisions similar to those contained in former pars. (1) to (3) of
this section see § 5525(5) to (8) of this title." This statement indicates that the Legislature
manifested a conscious intent to transfer all breach of contract claims based upon a writing
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Although the Romeo II court affirmed the result of the superior
court and concluded that the action was timely filed within six
years pursuant to the 1980 version of section 5527(2),46 the
supreme court refused to affirm the superior court's rationale to
the extent that it was based upon public policy concerns associated
with construction contracts. The following excerpt from Romeo II
clearly portrays the supreme court's unwillingness to proclaim that
construction contracts are distinct from other written contracts or
that they are peculiarly subject to a six-year statute of limitations
when other written contracts are subject to a four-year statute:
We note the Superior Court, in analyzing this case under the
current statutory scheme, concluded that section 5527, as
amended in 1982, provides the appropriate period of limitation
for written construction contract scenarios. The court
reasoned as follows:
"In the interest of fair play and in light of the expected
long-term life span of a house and/or commercial
structure and the builder's attendant ethical and legal
responsibilities to its customer, we find the purchaser and
his investment must be afforded the six years of
protection provided by section 5527. To find otherwise
would be grossly unfair to the buyer, who routinely
expends large sums of money in the hope of securing a
structurally and financially sound investment. Therefore,
we find the statute of limitations applicable to the
construction contract controversy with which we are
faced is section 5527, Six-year limitation . .. ."
Because the facts of this case do not implicate the current
statutory scheme for limitations of actions, we express no
opinion regarding the wisdom of the Superior Court's
conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the result of the Superior
Court, and hold that Romeo's complaint against Yezbak was
filed within the six-year limitation period provided by 42
4
Pa.C.S. § 5527(2) (1980) [now 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(8)]. 1
The supreme court's decision in Romeo II to distance itself from
the superior court's public policy-based rationale in Romeo I is
from the six-year limitation period to the four-year limitation period.
46. Romeo II, 652 A.2d at 833.
47. Id. at 832-33 (citation omitted) (emphasis and brackets added).
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significant. The Romeo II decision indicates that: (1) the supreme
court explicitly refused to adopt the public policy-based rationale
endorsed by the superior court for applying a six-year statute of
limitations to construction contracts; and (2) the supreme court
only affirmed the superior court's result because that result would
have been reached had the superior court considered the matter
under the 1980 statutory scheme pursuant to which all written
contracts, not just construction contracts, were subject to the
six-year statute of limitations contained in section 5527(2). Hence,
the supreme court effectively held that a claim for breach of a
written construction contract, if brought under the 1982
Amendment, would be subject to the four-year statute of limitations
period set forth in section 5525(8). Accordingly, cogent analysis of
the Romeo I and the Romeo II cases and the application of the
supreme court's holding in Romeo II support the conclusion that,
as a result of the 1982 Amendment, all breach of contract claims
based upon a writing, including claims for breach of a construction
contract, are subject to the four-year statute of limitations
contained in section 5525(8).
C.

Construction Contracts Should Not Be Afforded Treatment
Distinctfrom Other Written Contracts

As noted in Part II.A., supra, section 5525(8) (1982) is clear and
unambiguous. As a result, courts are not required to engage in any
statutory construction analysis. Nonetheless, even if section 5525(8)
was determined to be ambiguous, resort to statutory interpretation
dictates the conclusion that construction contracts are not to be
afforded treatment distinct from other written contracts.
To support a contention that construction contracts are unique
and, therefore, subject to something other than a four-year statute
of limitations, one may attempt to argue that certain aspects of
construction projects have been given specific treatment by the
legislature. By way of example, in support of such an argument,
one may point to the statute of repose that would apply to a claim
arising out of a construction project, 48 the statute of limitations for
actions involving land surveying, 49 and the statute of limitations for
48. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536. Section 5536 provides, inter alia, that an action brought
against any person lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning or supervision of
construction, or construction of any improvement to real property, must be commenced
within 12 years after completion of such construction.
49. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5537. Section 5537 states, inter alia, that an action to recover
damages against any person engaged in the practice of land surveying because of a claimed
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landscape architecture claims. 5° The existence of these provisions
does not lend support to an argument that construction contracts
are unique and that they should be treated in a manner different
from other contracts for statute of limitations purposes. Quite to
the contrary, while the Pennsylvania Legislature expressly
addressed "construction related" circumstances in each of the
provisions discussed above, the Legislature did not address
"construction contract" claims as distinct from any other contract
claim under the legislative scheme related to limitations of actions.
Clearly, this negative pregnant demonstrates that the Pennsylvania
Legislature is cognizant of construction-related claims, and that it
knows how to enact express provisions for such claims when it
sees fit.
It must be presumed that the Pennsylvania Legislature's failure to
enact a statute of limitations that expressly applies only to claims
for breach of a construction contract is intentional. This
presumption is supported by the maxim of statutory interpretation
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" which is well established in
Pennsylvania. That maxim "basically means that where some things
are specifically designated in a statute, things omitted should be
understood as excluded." 51 Pursuant to this doctrine, the omission
of a construction contract statute of limitations from the statutory
scheme must be understood as an intentional exclusion by the
Pennsylvania Legislature, especially in light of the Legislature's
decision to enact legislation relative to other aspects of
construction projects.
If the Legislature had intended to make claims for breach of a
written construction contract subject to a six-year statute of
limitations, the Legislature would have expressly so provided. The
absence of any such legislation indicates that the Legislature
intended that construction contracts be treated like all other
written contracts for statute of limitations purposes - they are
subject to the four-year limitations period of section 5525(8).
deficiency, defect, omission, error or miscalculation must be commenced within 21 years
from the time the services are performed.
50. See 42 Pa.C.S.A § 5538. Section 5538 requires, inter alia, that an action to recover
damages against any person engaged in the practice of landscape architecture because of a
claimed deficiency, defect, omission, error or miscalculation must be commenced within 12
years from the time the services are performed.
51. Wolfe v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 636 A.2d 1293, 1296 (Pa. Commw.
1994) (citing, inter alia, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921).
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CONCLUSION

The language of section 5525(8) is very clear that all claims for
breach of a written contract are subject to a four-year statute of
limitations. There are no exceptions set forth in section 5525(8).
Therefore, claims for breach of a construction contract are not
exempt from the requirement that such claims must be commenced
within four years. While section 5525(8) is unambiguous in its
application to all written contracts, analysis of the case law, in
particular the Romeo cases, only strengthens the conclusion that
the four-year statute of limitations of section 5525(8) equally
governs claims for breach of a construction contract.
The Romeo I case should not be relied -upon to circumvent the
applicability of a four-year statute of limitations to claims for
breach of a construction contract. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
should seize the opportunity that the Gustine case presents to
correct its mistaken holding in Romeo I that a six-year statute of
limitations applies to claims for breach of a construction contract.
Indeed, when the superior court revisits its Romeo I decision in the
context of the Gustine case, it should rely upon the analysis and
arguments presented in this Article to reiterate what section
5525(8) plainly dictates-that claims for breach of a construction
contract are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

